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Abstract 
This article attempts to provide a correction to the exclusive realist 
interpretations of Thomas Hobbes. It makes the point that Hobbes is not as 
close to a realist understanding of international relations as it has been 
prevalently held. Given Hobbes’s conception of man and the state of 
nature, the formation of Leviathan and the law of nature, it is here argued 
that Hobbes gives us a perception of international rel tions which is not 
always conflictual and comprises the adjustments of conflicting interests, 
leading to the possibility of alliances and cooperation in international 
relations.  
Keywords: Man, the sate, Leviathan, state of nature, law of nature. 
1. Introduction 
In International Relations (IR), Hobbes’s politics has widely 
been considered to be providing a basis for the realist understanding 
of international relations1. Although Hobbes himself did not say much 
about the relations between states, in his words Leviathans or 
Commonwealths, his name, together with Machiavelli’s, is cited 
almost in all treatments of what has come to be known as ‘realism’ in 
the academic IR. One may detect two ways in the use that the theorists 
of international relations have made of Hobbes’s ideas. The first one is 
that Hobbes’s theory of politics supplies a model of international 
                                                
1 The origins of this article go back to the late Professor Muharrem Tünay’s graduate 
class, Classical Political Thought, I attended in Fall 1987. I would like to record my 
thanks and commemorate his memory. An earlier version of this article has been 
published in Australian Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2006).  
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relations. The second one is that international relations do indeed 
seem to be similar to the relations among individual human beings 
that Hobbes depicts in the nature, or in the state of nature, which is a 
state of war. The students of IR have thus made use of Hobbes both in 
logical and descriptive terms. 
As to the logical or model use, it is argued that the model 
Hobbes provided or the students of IR made of his wr tings is what 
has come to be called a realist model. Hobbes is seen as the central 
figure when it comes to the origins of realist school in IR. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that there are similarities and continuities 
between Hobbes’s ideas and many realist scholars of IR in the 
twentieth century such as E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth 
Thompson, to name but a few. In a widely read textbook of 
international politics we have been assured that the ‘recent realist 
thinking derives especially from the political philosophies of the 
Italian theorist Niccolo Machiavelli and the English theoretician 
Thomas Hobbes’ (Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, 1995: 22). Steven Forde 
is no less sure in arguing that Hobbes was ‘the founder ... and a 
principal contributor’ to the classical realist tradition (1992: 75). 
Identifying three traditions in modern international thought –namely 
realism, rationalism and revolutionalism, Wight counted Hobbes 
among the great realists (1991: 17, 20). Beitz and Walzer have even 
taken the Hobbesian argument as constituting a ‘paradigmatic case’ 
for the realist students of IR, a paradigmatic case both of them want us 
to reject (Beitz, 1979: 8, 27-28; Walzer: 1977: 4).According to 
Hoffman, Hobbes’s version of realism is the most radic l formulation 
of that view and has a narrow focus (1981: 11, 14). 
Continuities have been discovered from Hobbes’s ideas to the 
writings of the twentieth century scholars. For insta ce, while Berki 
argues that there is continuity in ‘the tradition of Realpolitik from 
Machiavelli and Hobbes to Thompson and Morgenthau’ (1981: 142), 
Wight finds the basic arguments of Hobbes’s Leviathan and E. H. 
Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis to be the same. For Wight, ‘E. H: Carr’s 
Twenty Years’ Crisis … is essentially a brilliant restatement of the 
Hobbesian themes’ (1991: 6, 7; 1966: 121). Similarly, Bull considers 
Morgenthau’s work as ‘an attempt to restate the view of international 
relations contained in the works of Thomas Hobbes’ and he further 
adds that Hobbes’s views have been ‘refurbished in the writings of E. 
H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, Herbert Bu terfield’ 
(1981: 717, 719). Vincent and Hanson identify a distinct and 
recognizable ‘Hobbesian tradition’ in the twentieth century 
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international relations (Vincent, 1981; Hanson, 1984). No need to 
extend these examples. There seems to be a general conviction among 
many students of IR to regard Hobbes to be one of the forefathers of 
the realist model. 
Hobbes is also used in order to describe the present int rnational 
relations. It is a description derived from Hobbes’s conception of the 
state of nature, the natural condition that men assumed to have lived 
before the establishment of body politic, Leviathan. In the state of 
nature, men lived without a common authority to keep them in peace 
and each man only took care of himself and there was the constant 
possibility of war. I shall deal with Hobbes’s conception of the state of 
nature later. Let me first give some examples of how the students of 
IR depicted the present international relations similar to Hobbes’s 
state of nature. The Hobbesian tradition, Vincent tlls us, characterizes 
international relations as such: ‘International politics is a struggle for 
power; war is inevitable in the international anarchy; there is no right 
and wrong, only competing concepts of right; there is no society 
beyond the state; international law is an empty phrase’ (1981: 93). 
‘There is no such thing as international society’ (Wight, 1966: 92; 
1991: 32). ‘No ethical standards are applicable to relations between 
states’ (Carr, 1964: 153) ‘International politics, like all politics, is a 
struggle for power’ (Morgenthau, 1960: 27) ‘Coercion is and always 
has been inseparable from all politics’ (Aron, 1973: 451). It is well-
known that Waltz characterized international system as a ‘self-help’ 
system (1979). The epithet ‘Hobbesian’ is commonly used to 
designate the structure of international relations where there is the lack 
of authority and cooperation, disorder is rule and or er is exception, 
the actors always try to maximize their own interests at the expense of 
the others and peace is temporary and can only come if th re is a 
common or hegemonic power, or if the balance of power is 
maintained. 
By letting Hobbes speak for himself, I shall argue that this so-
called logical and descriptive account of Hobbes in IR does not do 
justice to him.2 In what follows, I shall first review Hobbes’s 
conception of man and based upon this conception his account of the 
formation of the Leviathan, that is, body politic or commonwealth. 
Then how Hobbes characterized international relations and 
                                                
2 In presenting my argument, I shall mainly rely on Hobbes’s Leviathan, published in 
1651, which expresses his ultimate standpoint, thoug  there may be some references to 
his two earlier political texts as well, namely The Elements of Law (1640) and De Cive 
(1642). 
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implications for IR of his politics will be reviewed. Finally I shall 
conclude that Hobbes, unlike Machiavelli whom could rightly be 
considered as a realist, may be considered as more of a rationalist than 
a realist. 
2. Man and the state 
Hobbes begins his account of the formation of the body politic, 
the state, with a conception of man. In the initial chapters of 
Leviathan, man is basically described as just one kind of anim l. Yet 
he is an animal which is different from other animals, by his passions 
and reason. His passionate side is not really different from other 
animals. As in all animals, the passions of man push him towards the 
things that appear to be pleasurable and away from th se things that 
appear to be painful. Man is thus drawn towards thoe things that give 
pleasure and retreated from those that give displeaur . This 
endeavour, ‘when it is towards something which causes it, is called 
Appetite or Desire…And when the endeavour is fromward something, 
it is generally called Aversion’ (Hobbes, 1651/1983: 2 ). This account 
of desire and aversion as imminent motions of man toward and away 
from something does not really differentiate him from other animals. 
However, it is significant for two reasons: First, Hobbes uses it when 
he defines the ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In his words: ‘But whatsoever is the 
object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part 
calleth Good: And the objects of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill’ 
(Hobbes, 1651/1983: 24). There is thus no such thing good or evil as 
separate from their usage by man. The terms good and evil are relative 
and depend upon the persons who use them. It is contextual; nothing 
is inherently good or evil. Secondly, the account is remarkable in 
terms of depicting man as full of activity; man thus does not, as rightly 
observed by Forsyth, have a static ‘essence’ or ‘being’ (1988: 130). 
He is an active, assertive and dynamic being.  
Although Hobbes characterizes man’s passions to be animalistic, 
there is, he argues, one passion/desire that distinguishes man from 
other animals, namely curiosity, -the ‘desire to know why and how’. 
Unlike other animals, man, by getting pleasure out of the continuous 
production of knowledge, was able to exceed the imminent pleasures 
(Hobbes, 1651/1983: 26) Curiosity together with reason distinguish 
man from other animals. Man has thus both passion and deliberation 
(1651/1983: 28) Man is drawn towards and away from the things, but 
he has got the capacity to calculate the effects of his motions. 
However, Hobbes makes it that ‘the passions of men ar  commonly 
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more potent than their reason’ (1651/1983: 98). Reason here means 
taking into account the rights of others, calculating the choices. Yet, 
man’s passions, which by definition do not involve the rights of 
others, are more influential than his reason. This paves the way for his 
famous conception of the ‘state of nature’.  
On the way to constructing the concept of the state of nature, 
Hobbes makes some additional assumptions and observations about 
man. First comes man’s the ‘right of nature’. In his earlier works the 
right of nature is defined as man’s natural underived right to all things: 
In The Elements of Law e read as follows: ‘Every man by nature 
hath right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to 
whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can’ 
(Hobbess, 1640/1969: 72). In Leviathan, the right of nature is defined 
as ‘the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will 
himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his 
own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own 
Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto’ (1651/1983: 66). In both definitions what is common is that 
man has the right and capacity to decide what is right and good. The 
difference is that while in earlier works this right is vaguely linked to 
man’s survival, in Leviathan man’s right of nature is based upon the 
preservation of his own life. When Strauss argues that, for Hobbes, 
self-preservation is the only absolute right and all other rights derive 
from that right (1965: 12-13), he indeed makes the right point. To 
Hobbes, self-preservation is the basic right and the s rongest desire of 
man and each man is capable of taking his own decisions and making 
distinctions between what is right and what is wrong. I  other words 
individual is a sovereign being. It should here be noted that Hobbes’s 
man does not just simply want to live, but he wants to live well. He 
has ‘desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living’ 
(1651/1983: 66). 
The second assumption/observation Hobbes makes about man is 
that all men are naturally equal in terms of mental and bodily 
capacities. Men are physically equal in the sense that ‘ he weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or 
by confederacy with others’. Men are mentally equal in the sense that 
‘howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or 
more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be 
many so wise as themselves’ (1651/1983: 63). Hobbes acknowledges 
the differences between men both in terms of mental and bodily 
capabilities, yet for him these differences are nots  considerable 
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given the basic equality he defined as such. If all men are equal and 
each man has a natural right to all things in order to preserve his life 
and have a good life as well, then, how is this guaranteed? 
Man assures his survival and obtains a good life by his power 
and ‘the power of a man…is his present means, to obtain some future 
apparent good’ (1651/1983: 43). Hobbes argues that each man seeks 
for power not just to assure for his life and obtain  good life, but also 
to make it permanent. The ‘object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once 
onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of 
his future desire’. Based on this, Hobbes boldly declar s: ‘So that in 
the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth 
onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes 
for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he 
cannot be content with a moderate power: but he cannot assure the 
power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the 
acquisition of more’ (1651/1983: 49-50). This is indeed the passage 
that led to the realist interpretation of Hobbes. Similar to man’s 
endless and restless desire for power, states are assumed to be in a 
situation of constant struggle for power in the inter ational arena. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the endless de ire for power, 
in Hobbes’s view, results from not the greedy and expansionist 
character of man, but from the fact that he does not feel secure with 
what he already has. It is obvious that the source of this feeling is the 
equality of men.  
Based on such characterizations, it is widely argued that Hobbes 
conceives a common human nature (Hanson, 1984: 339), and man’s 
nature is apolitical, asocial, in other words, selfi h and self-interested 
(Strauss, 1965: 3). It is indeed true that Hobbes conceives a common 
human nature. In the Introduction of Leviathan, he speaks of ‘the 
similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, 
hope’ and in the Conclusion, of ‘the known naturall Incli ations of 
Mankind’ (1651/1983: 2, 390). From the Introduction to the 
Conclusion, we are very often told common nature, common desire, 
common passions, and common fear of men. Although Hobbes 
conceives a common human nature as such, it must here be noted that 
his conception of man is not a static being; there is nothing inherent or 
essential in man, except the desire to preserve his own life and have a 
better life. 
On the basis of such a conception of man, Hobbes builds his 
conceptualization of the state of nature. Since all individuals are 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 419
selfish, self-seeking and self-interested, each trying to promote his 
own self-fulfillment, and all have equal mental and physical ability; 
then, no one can be secure and as long as there is not a ‘common 
power to keep them in awe’ and to regulate their behavior, they would 
be in constant war. This situation, the state of nature, is really a state 
of war, ‘a war of every man against every man’. It is worth to quote 
here the much-cited description: 
‘during the time men lived without a common Power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; 
and such a warre, as if of every man against every man… the 
nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the 
known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no 
assurance to the contrary… In such condition, there is no place 
for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of 
the commodities that may be imported by the Sea; no 
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing 
such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of 
the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; 
and which is worst of all continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitarity, poore, nasty, brutish and 
short… The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, 
have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is 
no Law: where no Law, no Injustice… there be no Propriety, no 
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every 
mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it’ 
(1651/1983: 64-66). 
This description of the natural condition of men befor  the 
establishment of a common power, i.e. the Leviathan, does not refer to 
a historical fact. It is not the actual fighting, but its constant 
possibility. Indeed Hobbes clearly states that ‘there was never such a 
time, nor condition of warre as this’ (1651/1983: 65). The state of 
nature is then for Hobbes a logical postulate developed in order to 
account for the establishment of the body politic. Though it is not 
conceived as an actual situation, but a logical postulation, how Hobbes 
conceptualized such a condition has been the subject matter of a 
dispute among the students of politics. While some argued that 
Hobbes just reflected the ‘anarchy of the market, which tends to be the 
form of all social relations in capitalist society’ (Macpherson, 1965: 
174); others disagreed with this view contending that t e seventeenth 
century England did not have the characteristics of a capitalist market 
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society (Thomas, 1965: 236). No doubt it is true that Hobbes reflected 
his time. The seventeenth century England could not have had an 
anarchy of the capitalist market, however, it could certainly be 
characterized with an anarchy of the political, religious and economic 
crisis among various segments of the society, a crisis that culminated 
in the English Civil War of 1640s, which Hobbes himself experienced. 
At the end of Leviathan, Hobbes expresses these circumstances when 
he tells us that the book had been ‘occasioned by the disorders of the 
present time’ (1651/1983: 391). Moreover, Hobbes was very much 
familiar with the Classical Greek authors who had this notion of 
conflict before the government. As if echoing Hobbes’s conception of 
the state of nature, Plato, for instance, makes a general observation 
that ‘humanity is in a condition of public war of every man against 
every man, and private war of each man with himself’ (Plato, 1964: 
626d). Similarly, when saying that competition, diffi ence (mistrust) 
and glory are the principal causes of conflict in the nature of man 
(Hobbes, 1651/1983: 64), Hobbes clearly relies on Thucydides, for 
whom the motives of the Athenians to expand were fear, honour and 
interest (Thucydides, 1910: 49-50).3 Whether he derived it from the 
observation of his time or the writings of classical authors, what is 
significant for Hobbes is that the state of nature is a conceptual tool to 
explain the emergence of the Leviathan. How does he do it or what 
makes men to leave the state of nature and establish a common 
power? 
If each man ardently pursues his own interests, as they do in the 
state of nature, then, it leads to the destruction of the very basis of 
man’s interests, i.e. his life itself. In a war of every man against every 
man, given the mental and physical equality of men, man is doomed to 
self-destruction. Hobbes argues that the same passions that led men to 
the state of nature –fear of death and the desire for commodious 
living- get him out of it. This is the beginning ofthe way out of the 
state of nature. Then comes man’s reasoning capacity. The experience 
of the state of nature makes man to use his capacity for reasoning and 
this leads to the formulation of what Hobbes calls the ‘Articles of 
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement’. The articles of 
peace are nothing but the laws of nature or the principles of the 
Natural Law, which men find out through his reason. The principles or 
articles are those which are required for the self-preservation and 
commodious living of men if they are to coexist (Hobbes, 1651/1983: 
                                                
3  I must here note it that Hobbes translated Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnessian 
War to English.  
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66). The laws of nature are actually the laws of human co-existence. 
In chapters 14 and 15 of Leviathan, Hobbes lists nineteen of them and 
in the Conclusion he adds a twentieth. He sums up the laws of nature 
in the principle of ‘doing to others, as we would be done to’ 
(1651/1983: 87, 144). 
Man’s passions of the fear of death and the desire to live a good 
life and his reasoning capacity make man to seek for the way out of 
the miserable condition of the state of nature and to form the laws of 
co-existence. If man is capable of formulating and agreeing upon 
some rules of co-existence, then, why to create a 
commonwealth/Leviathan? First of all, the laws of nature do not 
abolish man’s the right of nature. Secondly, Hobbes repeatedly makes 
it that covenants/contracts without a common power cannot be 
expected to be effective (1651/1983: 69-70, 74, 87)) When there is no 
common power with force and right sufficient to compel men to 
perform their contracts, the passions of men could easily lead to the 
breach of promises. Men therefore come together and give up their 
freedom and the right to govern themselves and submit to a sovereign, 
state, or society in return for the security of natur l rights. By 
submitting a sovereign each man transfers his natural right to it -
Leviathan. As seen, for Hobbes, the body politic is a means for the 
self-interest of man; it was deliberately created by men. The state is 
created in order to guarantee the conditions for man’s survival and a 
peaceful better life. The Hobbesian state comes into being out of the 
dual need for security and welfare. 
Here, the important thing is that the individual gives up his 
freedom and natural rights on the condition that others do the same. 
They come together and contract. Hobbes expresses thi  as such: 
‘I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to 
this Man, or to this Assemble of men, on this condition, that 
thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in 
like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is 
called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the 
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more 
reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the 
Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, 
given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he 
hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, 
that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them 
all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies 
abroad’ (1651/1983: 89-90).  
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This is how the Leviathan has been created. It is now better to 
note some points regarding the individual and the Hobbesian 
Leviathan –the state. 
Firstly, for Hobbes, the individual is ontologically prior to the 
state/society. The state is deliberately constructed and it is an 
‘artificial body’. The individual human being is, on the other hand, a 
real being, capable of deciding by and for himelf. Here we see that 
Hobbes disagrees with Aristotle who considered the state to be prior 
to the individual and to be a natural, not a constructed, being. That 
Hobbes considered the individual as ontologically prior to the state is 
quite obvious from his writings. As Strauss pointed out (1965: 15), the 
contention that there had been a state of nature which antedated civil 
society clearly shows the primacy of the individual. 
Secondly, the ground for the construction of society or the state 
is the individual self-interest. Society/state is con eptualized as a 
means to this end. Men created the state only becaus  the state of 
nature was unbearable. The state was constructed in order to provide 
men with internal peace and protect them against the external 
enemies. Then, the legitimacy and raison de’tat of a state are based 
upon whether it fulfills these tasks. Men are expected to obey the 
sovereign/state so long as it is capable of delivering those services, 
namely conditions of a secure and peaceful life. Hobbes argues that if 
a sovereign is conquered by another sovereign, the individuals can 
withhold their obedience and transfer it (1651/1983: 116). When 
government does not possess sovereignty or has lost it, obedience is 
no longer required, because, without sovereignty, it can not protect the 
rights of its subject. 
Thirdly, Hobbes Leviathan is sovereign, because mangives up 
his sovereignty in the formation of the state. Sovereignty is for 
Hobbes is both actual and contractual or legal. Thestate achieves 
sovereignty with the covenant of all men. Sovereignty of the state is 
just the projection of the natural right of man into the Leviathan. The 
‘Libertie of the Common-wealth [is] the same with tha , which every 
man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-
wealth at all’ (1651/1983: 112). Individuals are supposed to obey the 
commands of the sovereign, if they are to peacefully co-exist. Though 
sovereignty is based upon the covenant, it must be actual, because, 
‘Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to 
secure a man at all… For he that performeth first, has no assurance the 
other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to 
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bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passion , without the 
feare of some coercive Power’ (1651/1983: 87, 70-1). 
Hobbes sovereign has effective authority and it is therefore 
indivisible, no mix government, nor an autonomous chur h. The 
governor must be one, if there is more than one ruler, then, it may lead 
to factions and civil wars between ‘the Church and the State, between 
Spiritualists and Temporalists, between the Sword of Justice and the 
Shield of Faith’ (1651/1983: 252-253). However, for Hobbes, 
sovereignty is not absolute. Man had absolute sovereignty via his 
natural right, yet, even it had been limited by the very condition of the 
state of nature. The state’s sovereignty is limited, not just by the 
existence of other states, but also by the covenant on which it is based. 
Individual natural rights constitute the basic constraints upon the 
Hobbesian sovereign. If a sovereign does not provide the protection of 
individual-natural rights or commands their violation, the individual 
has the right to disobey. In Hobbes’s words: ‘If the Sovereign 
command a man... to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or no to resist 
those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, 
medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath 
that man the Liberty to disobey’ (1651/1983: 114). This is the reason 
why some argued that Hobbes’s sovereign is a weak one (Warrender, 
1957: 317). 
Finally, the chief purpose in the construction of the state is to 
assure peace. When presenting his description of the state of nature in 
his earlier work, De Cive, Hobbes writes that ‘no man can esteem a 
war of all against all to be good for him’ and tells us that the 
overriding purpose of his exposition is to show us ‘the highway to 
peace’ (1642/1836-45: 12). In his mature work, the fifth law of nature 
is declared to be ‘that every man strive to accommodate himselfe to 
the rest’ and ‘the fundamental Law of Nature… commandeth to seek 
Peace’ (1651/1983: 78-79). Hobbes did not glorify the war as Hegel, 
for instance, later did.  
To sum up so far, Hobbes’s conception of man has it that man is 
the primary being in the world and the state/Leviathan is just a means 
to peace and interests of the individual. How about the relations 
between states, does he, as claimed, presents an anarchical and 
conflictual situation similar to the picture depicted in the realist school 




3. Relations between states 
As already said, Hobbes did not write much about the relations 
between states. He basically dwelt on the domestic pol tics and tried to 
show the security and welfare to be obtained from constitutional 
order. Yet, he had enough reason to talk about interna ional relations. 
Bull indicated that in Hobbes’s time as in ours there were 
interdependence between civil conflicts and inter-sate conflicts, 
foreign interventions in the civil conflicts and religious loyalties 
linking the parties across state frontiers (Bull, 198 : 718). In other 
words, the Hobbesian Leviathan was not in an isolated situation and 
took place together with other Leviathans. Hobbes himself was indeed 
aware of this international interactions and interdependences. In his 
history of the English Civil War, Behemoth, he mentions the links of 
various groups in England with those in Scotland, the Low Countries 
and France (Hobbes, 1680/1969: 144). His silence on the relations 
between the states may be explained by his primary interest in 
domestic politics. As well-known, until the twentieth century, none of 
the great political thinkers of the past devoted himself primarily to the 
study of international relations. Hobbes was by no means an 
exception.  
However, he himself did depict international relations as a state 
of nature. The much-cited passage is worth to quote again: 
‘But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men 
were in a condition of warre one against another; yt in all times, 
Kings and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their 
Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and 
posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes 
fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns, upon 
the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their 
neighbours; which is a postulate of War. But because they uphold 
thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from 
it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men’ 
(1651/ 1983: 65). 
This is one of those famous passages that led to what I ave 
called the logical and descriptive uses by the students of IR of 
Hobbes’s writings. When taken out in itself, this passage and the one 
about the state of nature, together with his emphasis on power could 
easily be interpreted in what is called the realist model. What is more, 
while he considers the state of nature between individual persons 
(interpersonal state of nature) to be a logical postulate, he takes the 
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state of nature between the states (international state of nature) as a 
factual situation. 
It seems certain that Hobbes describes international relations just 
like the state of nature before the formation of the Leviathan. It could 
be argued that when Hobbes himself and especially those who made 
use of his writings in terms of the realist model drive the conclusion 
of international relations being a state of war, they apply the inter-
personal state of nature to the sphere of internatio l relations and 
make an analogy between the individual persons and states. With 
regard to this analogy, Hobbes provides textual support. In Leviathan, 
chapter 21, titled ‘Of Liberty of Subjects’, Hobbes attributes the states 
with the same rights as individuals had before the establishment of the 
Leviathan. In fact, it is this analogy between the individuals and the 
states, between the state of nature and international relations that 
constituted the basis for the realist interpretations of Hobbes. 
However, the analogy cannot be maintained for a variety of reasons. 
First of all, although Hobbes described both the fictional 
interpersonal state of nature and the factual international state of 
nature to be a state of war of everyone against everyon , he put 
forward a significant difference between the two. While the 
interpersonal state of nature is unbearable, the international state of 
nature is bearable. In the interpersonal state of nature man has no 
culture, no industry, no art, no navigation, no civilization and his life 
is poor, solitary, nasty and brutish. But, in the international state of 
nature as the states uphold the industry of their subjects, then, 
individuals do not have the misery that they experience in the 
interpersonal state of nature. That is why Hobbes does not suggest the 
establishment of a world/international Leviathan. I order to escape 
from the misery of the interpersonal state of nature man gives up his 
right to govern himself and create a Leviathan. Themechanism for the 
establishment of peace is the establishment of a common power to 
keep human beings in awe. If the states in the interna ional state of 
nature are like the individuals in the interpersonal st te of nature, then, 
the logical conclusion of the analogy could have ben the creation a 
world Leviathan in order to end the international anarchy. Indeed, 
Hobbes is criticized by the twentieth century realist Morgenthau 
(1960: 501) for not having followed the logical conlusion of the 
analogy. Indeed, the hegemonic stability argument of the twentieth 
century realists may be considered as the extrapolation of the 
Hobbesian Leviathan to the international system. 
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Secondly, the analogy cannot be maintained due to the 
differences between the individuals and the states. In the international 
state of nature, the entities (actors) in concern are not individuals, but 
states. As there is a difference between the real personalities 
(individuals) and institutional personalities (states), the question 
whether a conception of self-preservation for state could be advanced 
as it is for individuals (Beitz, 1979: 52) cannot easily be dismissed. 
Whose self-preservation is it any way, of the state or of the 
individuals within the states? Plus, do the states have the kind of life 
that individuals have? Let us agree with Heller that, in Hobbes’s view, 
‘life’ for the states is ‘the maintenance of sovereignty -the ‘artificial 
soul’, which gives life and motion to the whole body’. And Death for 
states comes ‘not when some critical proportion of its population or 
infra-structure is destroyed, but when force dissolves the 
commonwealth and ‘there is no further protection of subjects in their 
loyalty’ (Heller: 1980: 25-6). Nevertheless, there remains a difference 
between state sovereignty and individual sovereignty when it comes to 
the establishment of a common power. By sacrificing his sovereignty, 
the individual gains his security. But when state renounces its 
sovereignty (say, to a world government), instead of gaining security, 
its very existence is eliminated. This makes a great difference between 
interpersonal state of nature and international state of nature and thus 
there does not follow an international Leviathan. 
A third reason why the analogy cannot be maintained can again 
be given via the difference between the individuals nd the states. 
Hobbes’s conception of mental and physical equality of men does not 
hold for the states. The states are stronger than individuals in the state 
of nature. As Vincent said, states are not ‘vulnerable to a single deadly 
blow as individuals are; the death of the kings is not the death of 
kingdoms’ (1981: 94). For Hobbes, the state of nature among men is 
intolerable because men are equal in the sense that the weakest can 
defeat the strongest. Such equality has never existed among states. 
‘Disparities in size and resources have been too great… [so that] the 
universal insecurity of individuals in the state of nature has… been 
absent in international relations’ (Heller, 1980: 25). Moreover, 
Vincent argues that there is the possibility of order by strong states 
(1981: 95). In sum, since states are not equal, state of nature for them 
is not equally intolerable.  
Finally, the analogy between the interpersonal state of nature 
and the international state of nature falls due to the differences 
regarding the constraints upon the individuals and the states. In the 
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interpersonal state of nature, man has the underived right of nature, 
absolute sovereignty conditioned only by man’s being with others. 
However, the sovereignty of the state in the internatio al state of 
nature is doubly conditioned. On the one hand, there are constraints 
resulting from the co-existence of states. On the other hand, there 
come constraints imposed by the natural rights of men. Despite the 
seemingly similar characterizations of the individuals and the states in 
some passages, given his basic arguments, it is fair enough to 
conclude that for Hobbes states are not as free as the individuals. 
That the analogy between the interpersonal state of nature and 
the international state of nature -the core of the realist interpretations 
of Hobbes- cannot fully be held via Hobbes’s overall argument and 
the empirical observation of the states, I think, sufficiently refutes the 
exclusivist realist categorization of Hobbes. Furthe more, a closer and 
more comprehensive look at Hobbes’s conception of the state of 
nature rather than the famous selective descriptions taken out of 
Chapter 13 in Leviathan will reveal that, contrary to the prevalent 
view, even the conception of the state of nature dos not exhibit the 
characteristics attributed to it by the realist school in IR.  
At a first glance, Hobbes’s state of nature really ppears to be a 
war of all against all as he boldly declared. In the state of nature there 
is said to be no rules between individuals except the selfish and egoist 
wishes of each individual. Individual persons are said to live a self-
centered life with no regard for, and without any grouping with, 
fellow men. This presents us a picture of men similar to billiard ball 
model of the realist school. However, Hobbes’s overall argument 
makes room for the rules and allies in the state of nature. 
Hobbes’s state of nature is not fully lawless. First and foremost 
there are the rules of natural law. Laws of nature, which he calls the 
‘articles of peace’, apply to both the state of nature and state of 
society/commonwealth. In the state of commonwealth men have, 
besides the laws of nature, laws of sovereign or civil laws. The laws of 
nature are not the laws issued by a sovereign as the case with the civil 
laws, but they are the laws found out by man’s reasoning capacity. As 
I have already said he enumerated twenty or so laws of nature. Some 
of them are worth to cite here. The first law of nature for Hobbes is 
that ‘every man ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of 
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, … he may seek and use … 
Warre’ (1651/ 1983: 67). It is clear that for Hobbes war is only a means 
of last resort. The second and third laws of nature are respectively stated 
as ‘Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to 
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them’ and ‘ that men performe their Covenants made’ (1651/ 1983: 67, 
74). In other laws of nature, for example, each manis advised to ‘strive to 
accommodate himsefe to the rest; … acknowledge other for his Equall by 
Nature; … [and] look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the 
greatnesse of the good to follow’ in taking revenge (1651/ 1983: 78-80). 
As seen these are the rules of peaceful co-existence for multiple men, 
who are capable of erecting them by their reason. It is true, as already 
noted, the rules of natural law are not at all times effective due to man’s 
proneness to breach them as a result of his passions. To make them 
effective one needs a common power, the need that leads to the 
construction of Leviathan.  
Nonetheless, what this conception of the laws of nature, the laws 
that are valid at all times, tells us is that the state of nature is not 
devoid of common rules among men. Now, if international relations 
are conceived to be similar to the state of nature, then, men can make 
the rules of peaceful co-existence in the internatio l system through 
their reason. And these rules as seen have a heavy emphasis on peace, 
very unlike the realist picture of international relations as a structural 
positioning of states within a lawless situation of c nstant struggle. 
Moreover, in his works Hobbes expressly identifies the laws of nature 
with the laws of nations. Earlier he wrote: ‘For that which is the law 
of nature between man and man, before the constitution of the 
commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign 
after’ (1640/1969: 190). Later he confirmed: ‘Concerning the Offices 
of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, 
which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any 
thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of 
Nature, is the same thing’ (1651/ 1983: 189). The rul s of the law of 
nations are open to violation just like the rules of the natural law in the 
state of nature. As already stated, Hobbes did not suggest an 
international Leviathan to make the laws of nations being 
implemented. Like Rousseau (1970) and Kant (1969) later, he found 
an international Leviathan to be impractical (1651/ 1983: 87-88). 
In the state of nature man does not live alone. He is not an 
isolated, atomistic being living by himself and his interactions with 
others are not like the clashing billiard balls. Although Hobbes says 
that there is no mine and yours distinction in the state of nature, the 
chief reason why the Leviathan is constituted to assure internal peace 
and defense against external enemies. If there are external enemies, 
this means that there has already been a distinction between us and 
them. He also speaks of confederacies. That shows that men have 
allies and groupings in the state of nature. In one f his early works, 
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Hobbes precisely states this: ‘And so it happens, through fear of each 
other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and to get some 
fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all 
men, nor without some helps. Fellows are gotten either by constraint 
or by consent’ (1642/1836-45: 12). In Leviathan he repeats: ‘In a 
condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a 
common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man 
can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from 
destruction, without the help of Confederates’ (1651/ 1983: 75-76). 
Even before the construction of the proper state, man thus forms 
alliances and confederations. In Hobbes’s state of nature, there are not 
merely –as widely assumed- a multiplicity of indiviuals engaged in a 
war of all against all, but also security-communities of allies and 
confederations. It is not hence surprising that Hobbes considered that 
‘Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane 
Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not o ely lawfull, but 
also profitable for the time they last’ (1651/ 1983: 124).  
The state of nature is, then, to Hobbes, not merely a war of all 
against all as the famous Chapter 13 of Leviathan described. It 
includes both the rules of peaceful co-existence, i. . the laws of 
nature, and the means and mechanisms for the realization of peaceful 
co-existence, i.e. the alliances and confederations. Forsyth very 
persuasively suggests that it would be better to differentiate the 
Hobbesian state of nature into two: a condition in which individual 
men are solely and entirely governed by self-directed passions (raw or 
bare state of nature), and a condition in which the laws of peaceful co-
existence derived by reasoning are at work (state of nature modified 
by natural laws) (Forsyth, 1979: 197). The foregoin a alysis supports 
such an argument. 
4. Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that neither the analogy between the 
state of nature and international relations nor the conception of the 
state of nature as a war of all against all –the two major contentions 
through which Hobbes has been considered within the realist school of 
IR- can be justified on the basis of Hobbes’s writings. Hobbes’s man 
is not simply a passionate being, but has a reasoning capacity. Men 
can thus form alliances and unions and formulate the rules of peaceful 
coexistence. States too may form alliances and leagues and agree upon 
common rules, i.e. international law. As Navari rightly observed 
Hobbes belongs to the tradition of government by rules; unlike 
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Machiavelli who belongs to the tradition of government by men 
(Navari, 1982: 210). It is better to recall that Hobbes’s first two laws 
of nature –hence laws of nations- dictated to seek p ace as far as 
possible and to treat others as you wish to be treated. This is not the 
kind of discourse we see in realism. 
Hobbes’s political theory entails a journey from the state of 
nature to the state of society, from a state of war to a state of peace. 
This is an extremely radical transformation negating the status quo 
and establishing a totally different state of affairs. Very unlike of the 
realists! Hobbes does not speak of structural positioning of the units 
and he reifies neither the past nor the present, as realist thinking does. 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is an artificial body existing for the security and 
welfare of man. The real actors are then individual human beings, not 
the institutions. His chief purpose is prevalence of peace and 
attainment of welfare. His radicalism and emphasis on peace are not 
usefully summarized by the realist discourse in IR. It is true there are 
here and there descriptions and statements which may be taken to 
place him within realist tradition together with Machiavelli. Yet, 
unlike Machiavelli whom can rightly be considered as a realist, as I 
have shown above, Hobbes can justifiably be taken to be closer to the 
rationalist or natural law tradition rather than the realist tradition.  
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Thomas Hobbes ve Uluslararası Đlişkiler: Bir değerlendirme 
Bu makale Hobbes’un realist yorumlamalarını revize etmeyi amaçlıyor. Hobbes’un 
Uluslararası Đlişkiler literatüründe yaygın şekilde kabullenildiği gibi bir realist 
kavramsallaştırmaya yakın olmadığ  savunulmaktadır. Hobbes’un insan, doğa hali, devletin 
oluşumu ve tabii hukuk analizleri dikkate alınınca; uluslararası ilişkiler algısının daimi bir 
çatışma durumundan çok, çatışan çıkarların uzlaşması haline ve dolayısıyla da ittifaklara ve 
dayanışmaya yer veren bir nitelik arzettiği gösterilmektedir.  
Anahtar kelimeler: Đnsan, devlet, Leviathan, doğa hali, tabii hukuk. 
 
